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determination of the defendant's right to the writ entirely in the hands
of the courts is perhaps to allow them to usurp a legislative function,
but in viewing their use of it thus far one cannot say that they have
failed to protect the right of defendants to full litigation. Of course,
in the absence of a statute guaranteeing to a defendant the right to
attack a judgment for some error not apparent in the record, he is
always at the mercy of the courts of his particular era, whose opin-
ions as to the necessity of continuing the use of the writ may change.
That this possibility is not altogether remote can be borne out by the
virtual limbo of disuse into which the writ had fallen until compara-
tively recent times. A statute in New York similar to section 2255,
but not requiring incarceration at the time of bringing the action,
might seem to be advisable. The writ of coram nobis, rather than
being abolished, would be assimilated into such a statute. This was
undoubtedly the intention of the creators of section 2255, which in-
tention, however, failed.68 This failure points up one possible dis-
advantage to a statutory form of coram nobis. In construing the
statute the courts may actually restrict the areas in which coram nobis
may be granted. The purpose of coram nobis, as has been pointed
out, is to provide a remedy in a case where no other relief is available
to a defendant. As a result an important ingredient in coram nobis
is its flexibility. Rather than restrict its use to specific grounds the
courts should, and probably will, extend coram nobis to new situa-
tions in which the defendant has no other relief, as they develop.
Moreover, except in the cases where another remedy is provided
in the federal laws and none in the state laws, or vice versa, there;
would seem to be no valid reason for the different treatment in the
two judicial systems accorded some of the problems mentioned above.
A greater liberality on the side of the defendant would appear to be
the better rule in such situations, for while litigation must come to
an end sometime, undoubtedly most people would prefer to see the
courts overzealous in guaranteeing that a defendant will not be un-
justly convicted.
THE IMPOSTOR PAYEE, OR WHAT'S IN A NAME?
The impostor payee situation can arise only where one person
successfully impersonates another.' In the classic case a swindler
68 See United States v. Kerschman, 201 F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1953), where
coram nobis was thought to be superseded by § 2255. But as already stated in
the text, United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954), declared that the
statute was not inclusive of the field.
1 Aigler, Imposters in the Law of Bills and Notes, 46 MicH. L. REv. 787,
793 n.19 (1948).
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will induce a person to deal with him by pretending to be a well
known businessman of good reputation and credit. As a result of
these dealings the swindler receives a check payable to the business-
man he has impersonated. The swindler then endorses the check,
as made out, and cashes it at a bank. Of course by the. time the fraud
is discovered the swindler will not be amenable to process, and as a
result the loss must fall either on the drawer of the check or on his
bank.2
The loss is placed by deciding whether the impostor's endorse-
ment was forged or unauthorized, for under the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law no right or title can be taken through a forged or unau-
thorized endorsement,3 and a bank's contract with its depositor is
"to pay .. . checks only upon a genuine endorsement." 4 Conse-
quently, if the endorsement is forged or unauthorized the bank will
have to recredit the depositor's account. A leading case holding that
the loss should be on the drawer is Montgomery Garage Co. v. Manu-
facturer's Liab. & Ins. Co.5 In that case a bona fide purchaser from
the impostor was allowed to recover from the drawer on the ground
that the drawer intended the impostor, rather than the person imper-
sonated, to be the payee. Therefore the impostor was the proper
person to endorse, so that there was no forgery. This is the view
taken by most courts.6
The minority view is stated in the case of Tolman v. American
Nat'l Bank.7 In that case one Potter, representing himself to be
Haskell, went to Tolman to obtain a loan. He gave Haskell's resi-
dence and occupation as his own. After making inquiries about
Haskell, Tolman agreed to make the loan and gave Potter a check
2 The loss must fall on either of two groups, the drawer, maker, or special
endorser [if transferred by blank endorsement it will become bearer paper,
UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 9(5), N.Y. NEGOTIABLE INSTR.
LAW § 28(5)] from whom the impostor received the instrument, or the holder
or drawee who takes the instrument from the impostor. See Abel, The hn-
postor Payee: Or, Rhode Island Was Right, 1940 Wis. L. REv. 161, 162 (here-
inafter cited Abel, The Impostor Payee) ; Note, 23 IND. L.J. 484, 485 (1948).
3UNIFORm NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 23, N.Y. NEGOTIABLE INSTR.
LAW § 42.
4 Shipman v. Bank of N.Y., 126 N.Y. 318, 328, 27 N.E. 371, 373 (1891);
Midland Say. Bank & Loan Co. v. Tradesmen's Nat'l Bank, 57 F.2d 686 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 615 (1932); United States Cold Storage Co. v.
Central Mfg. Dist. Bank, 343 Ill. 503, 175 N.E. 825 (1931). "[T]he obliga-
tion of a bank to its depositor is to pay his checks, up to the amount of his
deposit, according to his direction, and if that direction is to pay to a person
named, or to his order, the bank must ascertain at its peril the identity of the
person named as payee or the genuineness of the indorsement if the check is
presented by an alleged indorsee." Id. at 826. (Emphasis added.) BRANNAN,
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 442 (7th ed. Beutel 1948) ; BRITTON, BILLs &
NoTES § 142 (1943). But see, Abel, supra note 2, at 210.
594 N.J.L. 152, 109 Atl. 296 (1920).6 See BRANNAN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 470; BRITTON, op. cit. supra note
4, § 151; 5 WILuSTON, CONTRAcTs § 1517B (1937).
7 22 RI. 462, 48 Atl. 480 (1901).
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drawn on the defendant bank payable to Haskell's order. Potter
endorsed Haskell's name on the check and transferred it to a third
person, who collected from the bank. When Tolman discovered the
fraud he demanded that the bank recredit his account by the amount
paid on the check. The appellate court set aside a verdict directed
for the defendant, declaring that the case should have gone to the
jury, and granted a new trial. The court said: "[Al s the case stood,
the plaintiff had ordered money paid to Haskell. The bank had not
so paid it. The fact that the plaintiff had been imposed upon did not
relieve the bank from its duty to see that the money was paid accord-
ing to order." 8 While this is distinctly the minority position it has
received some very able support.9
In resolving the problem, the Negotiable Instruments Law itself
is found to be of limited aid. Several sections have been referred
to as bearing on the point. Section 9(3),10 stating that an instrument
payable to the order of a fictitious or non-existing person 11 is bearer
paper, does not apply because it is held that this section is a restate-
ment of the common law 12 and requires that the drawer must have
intended to draw the check to a fictitious person.13
Under section 61 14 the drawer admits the existence of the payee
and his capacity to endorse. But this is held to compel admission of
8 Tolman v. American Nat'l Bank, 22 RI. 462, 48 At. 480, 482 (1901).
"Waiving the question of forgery .... the signature in this case is clearly
one 'made without the authority of the person whose signature it purports
to be,' and therefore it is wholly inoperative." Ibid.
9 Abel, The Impostor Payee at 398-99.
'
0 UNnoRm NEGOTmABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 9 (3), N.Y. NEGOTIABLE INSTR.
LAW § 28(3).
11 "Fictitious or non-existing person," as used in the statute, is not restricted
to one who is actually fictitious or non-existing but includes real and existing
persons where the drawer intends that they have no right or interest in the in-
strument. Norton v. City Bank & Trust Co., 294 Fed. 839 (4th Cir. 1923) ;
Phillips v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 140 N.Y. 556, 35 N.E. 982 (1894) ; Snyder
v. Corn Exch. Nat'l Bank, 221 Pa. 599, 70 At. 876 (1908); BITTON, BiLLs
& Nomrs 700-02 (1943). See also ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 98, §29(3) (Smith-Hurd
1935) : The instrument is payable to bearer when "it is payable to the order
of a fictitious or nonexisting or living person not intended to have any interest
in it, and such fact was known to the person making it so payable, or . . .
Jthe] agent who supplies the name of sutch payee." (Emphasis added.)
122 HALSBURY, LAws OF ENGLAND 620 n. h (2d ed. 1931). The common
law, however, was changed by the English Bills of Exchange Act of 1882
§ 7(3), 45 & 46 Vict. c. 61, Bank of England v. Vagliano Bros. [1891) A.C.
107, 129-30.
13 "The instrument is payable to bearer: (3) [W]hen it is payable to the
order of a fictitious or non-existing person, and such fact was known to the
person making it so payable... ." See note 9 supra. Seaboard Nat'l Bank
v. Bank of America, 193 N.Y. 26, 34, 85 N.E. 829, 831 (1908) (dictum);
Shipman v. Bank of N.Y., 126 N.Y. 318, 330, 27 N.E. 371, 374 (1891)
(dictum) ; Abel, supra note 9, at 201.
14 UNIFORm NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 61, N.Y. NEGOTIABLE INSTR.
LAW § 111.
1958]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
the endorsing capacity of the designated payee only-not of a fraudu-
lent one.15
Section 23 1 declares that no right or title can be acquired
through a signature that was either forged or made without the au-
thority of the person whose signature it purports to be. However,
this section will not operate until and unless a forgery is established,
so that it is of no help in determining this fact in the first instance.' 7
In some few cases the courts have relied on the theories of neg-
ligence and estoppel to place the loss.' s  However, since the law of
15 Robertson Baking Co. v. Brasfield, 202 Ala. 167, 79 So. 651 (1918).
"The section does not make Brasfield [the drawer] admit that any one other
than his named payee could properly and legally indorse the check." Id. at
653. See also McCornack v. Central Say. Bank, 203 Iowa 883, 211 N.W. 542
(1926) (section is for benefit of holders of paper if drawee does not pay)
(dictum); American Express Co. v. People's Say. Bank, 192 Iowa 366, 181
N.W. 701 (1921).
16 UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 23, N.Y. NEGOTIABLE INSTR.
LAW § 42.
17 Cf. Tolman v. American Nat'l Bank, 22 R.I. 462, 48 Atl. 480 (1901).
"It is a surprising doctrine that if A. can successfully personate B., he thereby
escapes being guilty of forgery in signing B.'s name on a check of C.'s." Id.
at 481. Cohen v. Lincoln Say. Bank, 275 N.Y. 399, 10 N.E.2d 457 (1937);
Seaboard Nat'l Bank v. Bank of America, 193 N.Y. 26, 85 N.E. 829 (1908)
United Cigar Stores Co. v. American Raw Silk Co. Inc., 184 App. Div. 217,
171 N.Y. Supp. 480 (1st Dep't 1918). Semble, Hubsch v. United States, 256
F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1958). See also UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-405(2).
Regarding the situation where a person with the same name as the payee
wrongfully endorses, see Slatterly & Co. v. National City Bank, 114 Misc. 48,
186 N.Y. Supp. 619 (N.Y. City Ct. 1920). See also Graves v. American Exch.
Bank, 17 N.Y. 205 (1858) (Where one not intended to be the payee of a bill
but having the same name endorsed and transferred it knowing that he was not
intended as the payee, such endorsement was held to be "if not technically a
forgery . . . at all events spurious and false."). But see Weisberger Co. v.
Barberton Sav. Bank Co., 84 Ohio St. 21, 95 N.E. 379 (1911), 60 U. PA. L.
REv. 443 (1912), wherein a check payable to one Max Roth was sent to the
wrong address and fell into the hands of another Max Roth who endorsed and
cashed it. The court stated that the endorsement was a forgery but that the
drawer could not recover against the bank because of his negligent conduct.
"He was first at fault and his mistake caused the loss." See also Keck v.
Browne, 314 Ky. 151, 234 S.W.2d 183 (1950), where a check sent to one Ben
Browne in Lexington was delivered to another person of that name who en-
dorsed and cashed it. It was held that the loss fell on the drawer because he
did not use Browne's street address, although he knew it. See 39 Ky. L.J.
476 (1951).
Is C. E. Ericson Co. v. Iowa Nat'l Bank, 211 Iowa 492, 230 N.W. 342
(1930); Grand Lodge v. State Bank, 92 Kan. 876, 142 Pac. 974 (1914);
Keck v. Browne, 314 Ky. 151, 234 S.W.2d 183 (1950) ; Young v. Gretna Trust
& Say. Bank, 184 La. 872, 168 So. 85 (1936); United States Guar. Co. v.
Hamilton Nat'l Bank, 223 S.W.2d 519 (Tenn. 1949); Defiance Lumber Co. v.
Bank of Cal., 180 Wash. 533, 41 P.2d 135 (1935). See also Maryland Cas.
Co. v. Central Trust Co., 297 N.Y. 294, 79 N.E.2d 253 (1943). Cf. Board of
Educ. v. National Union Bank, 121 N.J.L. 177, 1 A.2d 383 (1938), wherein it
was held that negligence of persons employed as public servants by a munici-
pal corporation could not he imputed to the employer. Comment, 18 U. CHI.
L. REv. 281, 285-86 (1951).
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negotiable instruments has a law merchant background, 19 it could be
argued that the common-law concept of negligence should not be used
by courts in settling disputes under it.
The principal explanation given by the courts when they place
the loss is that they are giving effect to the drawer's actual intention
at the time he drew the instrument. 20  In order to do this, the courts
use what is called the dominant intent theory.21 Under this theory,
when the drawer deals with an impostor before him, he has two in-
tentions: first, to deal with the person the impostor pretends to be;
second, to deal with the person physically before him. While a name
is one means of identification, a surer means is afforded by physical
presence. 22 The drawer normally wants to deal with the person and
not the name. Therefore, it is said his dominant intent is to deal
with the person physically before him. He is the one to whom the
drawer wants to make the instrument payable and therefore the im-
postor is the proper person to endorse.23  In effect, the courts call
upon their literary background to ask: "What's in a name?" 24
However, it is not so clear that *one deals only with a name and
a physical presence. It has been suggested that these do not make
up the entire person dealt with; 25 that together with these is their
relationship, in the mind of the drawer at least, to something else-
for example, some type of wealth-and that perhaps uppermost in
the mind of the drawer is this wealth. It is this relation to the wealth
that, in effect, dominates the intention of the drawer.26 On this think-
ing it would seem that, unless the person endorsing the instrument
were actually the person who bore the relation to the wealth that was
the inducement to the issuing of the instrument, the endorsement
would be a forgery.
19 BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 1-3, 54-55 (7th ed. Beutel
1948) ; Abel, Impostor Payee at 225.
20 BarrTo, BILLS & NOTES § 151, at 720-22 (1943); 23 IND. L.J. 484, 486
(1948). See also 5 WILLISTON, CoNRAcrs § 517, at 4238 (1936).
21 Ibid.
22 Halsey v. Bank & Trust Co., 270 N.Y. 134, 200 N.E. 671 (1936). "The
name, however, is not always controlling. Physical presence often is a surer
means of identification." Id. at 139, 200 N.E. at 673.
23 "Although one may be deceived as to the name of the man with whom he
is dealing, if he dealt with and intended to deal with the visible person before
him the check may properly be indorsed by the impostor." Id. at 139, 200
N.E. at 673.
24 Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, Act II, scene 2.
25 See 3 CoRiN, CONTRACTS § 602, at 385 (1951).
26 Abel, The Impostor Payee at 230; BIGE.ow, BILLS, NOTES & CHECKS 102
n.2 (3d ed. 1928) ; BRIrrON, BILLS & Noms § 151, at 717 (1943). "If a person
issues a check to another person, and the facts are exactly as he had been led
to believe they were, he will never complain. If some of the facts are as he
supposed they were and some of them are different, he will complain depending
on how seriously his interests are affected by the unanticipated truth." Id.
at 717.
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An argument in support of the result reached by the dominant
intent theory might be called the "money in the hand" theory.27 If
the drawer of the check had cash in his hand and chose to give the
cash instead of a check, to whom would he give it? Obviously he
would give it to the impersonator, believing him to be another. The
conclusion of this argument is that since he would be out of pocket
in that case, he should not be allowed to complain now, and shift his
loss to the person taking in good faith from the impostor. An an-
swer made to this argument is that the rules governing the transfer
of bearer paper should not be used to solve a problem involving order
paper.
28
Whatever the merit of the above criticism of the dominant intent
rule's application, the rule itself has met with a telling objection, the
tenor of which has been stated by Judge Lehman in Cohen v. Lincoln
Say. Bank: 29 "Perhaps, in truth, both intents are so inseparable
that the choice of one intent rather than the other is purely arbitrary
-an' example of rationalization perhaps unconscious, to reach a de-
sired result." 80 In accord with this it has been stated as a general
proposition that there is no sciientific foundation whatever for saying
that where the component parts of a complex stimulus, such as are
involved in an impostor payee situation, operate to produce a given
reaction they can be broken down and the resultant conduct attributed
to any one of the isolated elements.8 1
If these positions referred to are correct it would seem clear that
the dominant intent theory is a legal fiction. A danger in continuing
its use as a rule of law exists if it is not universally appreciated as
such and if courts apply it as a valid exposition of the mental proc-
esses in given circumstances to determine liability.
Applications of the Rule
The impostor payee rule has been applied in several situations
each having a different degree of association between the drawer and
the impostor. In one situation an impostor deals face to face with
the drawer. Here there is a meeting of at least some duration be-
tween the two, and the drawer is in as good a position as the im-
27 Aigler, Imposters in the Low of Bills & Notes, 46 1hfiC. L. Rev. 787,
791 (1948).
28 "Bearer paper follows its own rules, which take no account of the identity
of title of those through whose hands it has passed but are concerned only with
whether there has been delivery to one possessing the qualifications for a holder
in due course. . . . [A] thief or a finder can pass such paper on so as to
give those taking from or under him a position superior to that of prior
parties." Abel, The Impostor Payee at 164.29275 N.Y. 399, 10 N.E.2d 457 (1937).
3o Cohen v. Lincoln Say. Bank, 275 N.Y. 399, 407-08, 10 N.E.2d 457, 461
(1937) (Lehman, J.).
81 Abel, The Impostor Payee at 229-30. See also 8 N.C.L. REv. 76, 77
(1929).
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postor's transferee to require identification of him. There is a pos-
sibility that the drawer has a mental picture of the person to whom
he makes the check payable A2  The great majority of negotiable in-
strument cases are to the effect that the drawer intends to deal with
the impostor and that he is the proper person to endorse.33 In a
similar situation, the law of sales employs the same reasoning and
concludes that at least a voidable title passes to the impostor which
can be perfected by a sale to a bona fide purchaser. 3 4  One situation,
where the parties deal face to face, should be distinguished. That is
where the impostor claims to be the agent of someone else. Here
the rule is that since the drawer never intended to deal with the im-
postor as payee the instrument cannot be properly endorsed by him.35
A different situation exists where the two deal by mail or over
the telephone. There is less association upon which to base a mental
image, weakening the contention that the drawer intended to deal
with the impostor who wrote or telephoned rather than the person
whom the impostor pretended to be. The law of sales, which was
looked to by the courts for an analogy in the prior situation,36 holds
that in a transaction carried on by correspondence the dominant in-
32 Aigler, Imposters in the Law of Bills & Notes, 46 MicH. L. REv. 787,
790-92 (1948).33 Montgomery Garage Co. v. Manufacturers' Liab. Ins. Co., 94 N.J.L. 152,
109 At. 269 (1920); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACrS § 1517B, at 4245-46 (1936);
BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INsTRUmENTS LAw 470 (7th ed. Beutel 1948) ; BrToN,
BILLS & NorEs § 151, at 715 (1943). Cf. Cohen v. Lincoln Say. Bank, 275
N.Y. 399, 10 N.E.2d 457 (1937), wherein a check was specially endorsed to a
man who was introduced as Harry Wolter. He was an impostor. The court
said that plaintiff had no reason to suspect fraud and that therefore there was
no reason to require further identification. Plaintiff named as payee the person
whom he intended-Harry Wolter, the owner of the condemnation award. "The
absence of all prior dealings differentiates this case from every case which has
been cited to sustain the contention of appellants .... The impostor did not
deceive 'by misrepresenting his responsibility or character.' He deceived by
inducing Goldberg and Abrams to believe that he was Harry Wolter who, as
they thought, was assigning an award which he owned, and thus he succeeded
in appropriating what was intended for another." Id. at 411, 10 N.E.2d at 462.
34 Phelps v. McQuade, 220 N.Y. 232, 115 N.E. 441 (1917); Phillips v.
Brooks Ltd. [1919] 2 K.B. 243; Edmonds v. Merchants' Despatch Transp. Co.,
135 Mass. 283 (1883); 3 WILLISTON, SALES § 635 (rev. ed. 1948); RESTATE-
MENT, CONTRACrS § 475, illus. 6 (1932).3 5 Strang v. Westchester County Bank, 235 N.Y. 68, 128 N.E. 739 (1923);
United Cigar Stores Co. v. American Raw Silk Co., 184 App. Div. 217, 170
N.Y. Supp. 480 (1st Dep't 1918), aff'd mem., 229 N.Y. 532, 129 N.E. 904(1920); McCornack v. Central Say. Bank, 203 Iowa 883, 211 N.W. 542, 545(1926). See also 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACrS § 1517B, at 4246-47 (1936). In
the Strang case, sipra, a lawyer, Bushnell, induced a party to lend money on a
mortgage to his client X. In fact there was no such person as X and the
lawyer himself owned the "mortgaged" property. The lawyer's endorsement
of the check with the name of X was held to be a forgery. The court stated
that the plaintiff did not intend to deal with Bushnell and that he was merely
an agent even though the property was his.
36 5 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcTS § 1517B, at 4246 (1936) ; Abel, Impostor Payee
at 223 n.213.
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tent is to deal with the person impersonated.3 7  Nevertheless, the
majority of cases in the negotiable instruments area hold that the
intent is to deal with the impostor and consequently the latter's en-
dorsement is not a forgery.
38
In a third situation, there is no personal contact between the
parties. This can occur in several ways, a common one being where
a drawer signs checks prepared for his signature, such as monthly
payroll checks.A9 In such a case the dominant intent argument would
seem to be least convincing if considered as other than a legal fiction.40
Payroll situations can be broken into several categories. First,
a dishonest agent who is authorized to draw and sign checks in the
corporation's name, draws a few extra checks planning to cash them
and keep the proceeds for himself. These will be payable to either
real or non-existent persons 1.4  Employing the dominant intent rule,
37 Phelps v. McQuade, note 34 supra. See Boatsman v. Stockmen's Nat'l
Bank, 56 Colo. 495, 138 Pac. 764 (1914) ; Cundy v. Lindsay, 3 A.C. 459 (1878);
5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1517, at 4239 (1936); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS
§ 475, illus. 7 (1932).
38 Halsey v. Bank & Trust Co., 270 N.Y. 134, 200 N.E. 671 (1936). "The
attempt at all times is to effectuate the intent of the drawer, and where the
impostor, although never physically present, is clearly shown to be the person
to whom payment was intended his indorsement on the check is not invalid as
a forgery." Id. at 139, 200 N.E. at 673 (dictum). See also Boatsman v. Stock-
men's Nat'l Bank, 56 Colo. 495, 138 Pac. 764 (1914); Uriola v. Twin Falls
Bank & Trust Co., 371 Idaho 332, 215 Pac. 1080 (1923); BRITTON, BILLS &
NOTES § 151, at 715, 720 (1943). But see Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Silverman,
148 App. Div. 1, 132 N.Y. Supp. 1017 (1st Dep't 1911), aff'd on opinion below,
210 N.Y. 567, 10 N.E. 1134 (1914). Defendant attempted to set up as a coun-
terclaim a forged check on which the bank had paid out. On appeal, the
court reversed the trial court's dismissal of the counterclaim. As part of
defendant's business practice he purchased claims of army officers for their
future salary. In response to a request by letter that he purchase such a claim,
defendant, after checking the service list, mailed a check to a Lieutenant
Colonel Frederick Marsh. The court held that the endorsement of the check
by the impostor was a forgery, stating that defendant fully protected himself
by addressing his correspondence in the name of the official, with his official
title prefixed, and by making the check payable to the official by his respective
title of office.
39 The payroll situation has been said not to be a true impostor situation
because there is an imposition only on the party who takes the instrument from
the impostor. Abel, The Impostor Payee at 168-69. However it would seem
proper to treat it, since all courts determine the liability of the parties on the
dominant intent theory and several have explicitly held that it is an impostor
situation.
40American Nat'l Bank v. United States, 250 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1957).
"As in the case of countless other routine commercial transactions in which
claims for payment or refund are processed in the business world, there is
little to breathe into the transaction an articulate consensual 'intent' which
would characterize more weighty matters or those found in a more primitive
society." Id. at 117. It would seem that the court attributes to the drawer the
intent that he should have had, had he addressed his thoughts to his signing.
RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §§ 241-48 (1936) (judicially ascertained intent).
41 A real person who is not intended to have any interest in the proceeds
[ VOL. 33
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the courts reason that the intent of the corporation is the intent of
the person drawing the check,42 i.e., the agent. If he makes it
payable to a real person, who is not intended to receive it, the in-
strument becomes bearer paper. Therefore it requires no endorse-
ment and no signature can be deemed a forgery. Hence the drawer
can never recover from the bank for money paid out on the check.43
On the other hand, if an authorized agent draws a check payable to
a non-existent person, the courts reason that the corporation's in-
tent, being the intent of the agent,4 4 is to make the check payable to
a person known to the drawer to be fictitious and again the instru-
ment becomes bearer paper. 45
However, the agent's duty may be merely to prepare checks pay-
able to persons to whom the corporation is in debt and submit them
to an officer of the corporation, who has the power to sign them.
Again using the dominant intent theory, the courts attempt to deter-
mine the "intent" of the corporation. The reasoning is that the cor-
poration's intent is the intent of the officer signing the checks 46 and,
assuming he is not a party to the fraud, his intent is that the payee
be the person represented by the name on the instrument. The checks
are not payable to bearer.4 7  Consequently if it is made out to a real
person, such as a person working with a dishonest agent, that person
only is the proper party to endorse,4s and such an endorsement
of an instrument is considered a "fictitious" person. Phillips v. Mercantile
Nat'l Bank, 140 N.Y. 556, 35 N.E. 982 (1894).
42 Phillips v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, supra note 41; United States Cold
Storage Co. v. Central Mfg. Dist. Bank, 343 Ill. 503, 175 N.E. 825 (1931);
BRITroN, BILLS & NOTES 699-702 (1943).
43 Norton v. City Bank & Trust Co., 294 Fed. 839 (4th Cir. 1923) ; Bartlett
v. First Nat'l Bank, 247 Ill. 490, 93 N.E. 337 (1910) ; Snyder v. Corn Exch.
Nat'l Bank, 221 Pa. 599, 70 Atl. 876 (1908) ; BRrroN, BILLS & NOTES 698-702(1943) ; WHITNEY, BILLS & NOTES 47-48 (1948). See also Litchfield Shuttle
Co. v. Cumberland Valley Nat'l Bank, 134 Tenn. 379, 183 S.W. 1006 (1916),
wherein a manager who was authorized to draw checks for a corporation forged
endorsements on certain of the checks and procured payment to himself. It
was held that by negotiating the checks the manager warranted that they were
genuine and neither he nor the corporation could set up the forgery.
44 See note 42 supra.
45 BRITTON, BILLS & NOTES 698-99 (1943) ; WHITNEY, BILLS & NOTES 47-48
(1948).
46 United States Cold Storage Co. v. Central Mfg. Dist. Bank, 343 Ill. 503,
175 N.E. 825 (1931). BRITTON, BILLS & NoTES 703-06 (1943).
47 Ibid.; WHITNEY, BILs & NorEs 47 (1948).
48 Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Union Trust Co., 37 F. Supp. 3 (W.D.N.Y.
1941). One O'Connel, an adjuster for an insurance company, conspired with a
doctor and others to present fraudulent accident claims. He would report the
alleged accident and submit recommendations for settlement. Three drafts
were involved in the case, one each to X, Y, and Z, X being an actual person
using his true name and Y and Z being actual persons using assumed names.
The court found that X did not endorse but that his endorsement was made by
another and was a forgery. As to Y and Z, the court found that they them-
selves endorsed using the names they had taken for the purpose of the fraud.
"They were real persons although they were using aliases to aid them in their
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would not be a forgery. However if another person, such as the
agent himself, endorses, that will be a forgery.
49
If an agent submits to the company officer a check made out
to a fictitious person the courts, although all apply the dominant in-
tent theory, are not in agreement as to the result. Under the minor-
ity view the reasoning is that the corporation must have intended to
deal with someone. The only person in the picture being the agent,
he must be the proper person to endorse, and should he do so, there
will be no forgery.50 Conversely, under the majority 51 view the
fraudulent scheme. The intent of the drawer . . . should govern in deter-
mining whether there was a forgery." Id. at 4. The court held that Y and Z
could transfer -title to the drafts because they were identified by previous deal-
ings with the insurance company and intended to be described by the names
Y and Z in the drafts issued themi
49 Fitzgibbons Boiler Co. v. National City Bank, 287 N.Y. 326, 39 N.E.2d
897 (1942) ; Fidelity Deposit Co. v. Union Trust Co., supra note 48.
50 Atlantic Nat'l Bank v. United States, 250 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1957), citing
United States v. Continental-American Bank & Trust Co., 175 F.2d 271 (1949)
and Continental-American Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 161 F2d 935
(5th Cir. 1947). But see McCornack v. Central Say. Co., 203 Iowa 883, 211
N.W. 542 (1926). (Forgery can be in name of fictitious person if intention is
to defraud. Id. at 545.) At least one writer feels that the payroll situation
is not a true impostor situation for there is really only one imposition, that on
the one to whom the instrument is delivered. Abel, The Impostor Payee at
168-69. However, the results reached in the decisions are the same as though
it were, once the courts apply the dominant intent rule.
51 The two views are clearly set out in Atlantic Nat'l Bank v. United States,
250 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1957), where one Howard, a tax collector, submitted
lists of names of persons to whom a tax refund was due. These names were
fictitious. The collector obtained the checks and endorsed the name of the fic-
titious or non-existent payee. The majority, feeling that it was an impostor
case, held that the collector was the proper person to endorse. "[T]he deal-
ings had to be between the Revenue Service and some person, otherwise the
papers would never have been submitted in the first instance. And, of course,
the only person was Howard .... [I]t was with him, under other names, that
the government was necessarily carrying on its dealings." Id. at 118. (Em-
phasis aaded.) The opposite view is taken of the same facts in a strong
dissent. "It seems clear to me that Howard simply appropriated checks in-
tended for 109 other, albeit fictitious persons, and that he did not become a
human chameleon by impersonating each of those many people. It seems
preposterony to say that Howard was the real payee, the person for whom each
of the 109 checks was really intended. . . . Instead, I would say, 'While that
person was non-existent, it certainly was not Howard, who had misrepresented
the existence of such person, but not that he himself was that person.'" Id. at
119 (dissenting opinion). (Emphasis added.) The closest case found on the
point in New York is Hartford v. Greenwich Bank, 157 App. Div. 448, 142
N.Y. Supp. 387 (1st Dep't 1913), aff'd on opinion below, 215 N.Y. 726, 109
N.E. 1077 (1915), overruled in Ulman Co. v. Central Union Trust Co., 257
N.Y. 563, 178 N.E. 796 (1931) (mem. opinion). In the Hartford case, a com-
pany's dishonest employee submitted bills purported to be owing to one James
Wilson. The company drew checks covering the amounts and mailed them to
a post office box, which the employee had rented in the name of Wilson. The
holding that the company intended to make the check payable to the employee
was overruled in the Ulman case, sapra, where the court said it was incon-
sistent in principle with Strang v. Westchester County Nat'l Bank, 235 N.Y.
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courts feel that whoever the corporation intended as the payee, it
certainly was not their dishonest agent, so that if he endorses the
instrument it is treated as a forgery.5 2  It would seem that if the
check were treated as a nullity the result would be the same, since
the cases involving such paper hold that the banks should not pay
out on this type of instrument.53
At least two legislative solutions to the impostor payee problem
have been proposed and are in effect in some jurisdictions. One is
the "Fictitious Payee Act," 54 amending section 9(3) of the Uni-
form Negotiable Instruments Act. This amendment designates as
bearer paper an instrument prepared for signature by a dishonest em-
ployee, making endorsement unnecessary, so that there could be no
forgery which would allow the drawer to recover. Thus where an
instrument was drawn by an officer of the corporation to a person
known only to a dishonest agent to be non-existent there would be
no forgery. The loss in all these cases would fall on the drawer.
A more comprehensive proposal is embodied in the Uniform
Commercial Code.5 5 Under the Code an endorsement by any person
'468, 139 N.E. 576 (1937), note 30 supra, and United Cigar Stores Co. v.
American Raw Silk Co., 184 App. Div. 217, 171 N.Y. Supp. 480 (lst Dep't
1918), aff'd mem., 229 N.Y. 532, 129 N.E. 903 (1920).52 Cohen v. Lincoln Say. Bank, 275 N.Y. 399, 406, 10 N.E.2d 457, 460
(1937); Shipman v. Bank of New York, 126 N.Y. 318, 27 N.E. 371 (1891);
Commonwealth v. Globe Indem. Co., 185 AtI. 796 (Pa. 1936), where the court
held that the drawer did not intend that the dishonest clerk should endorse the
payee's name. Further, the court said the checks were not susceptible of a
genuine endorsement. See also United Cigar Stores Co. v. American Raw
Silk Co., supra note 51 ; United States Cold Storage Co. v. Central Mfg. Dist.
Bank, 343 Ill. 503, 175 N.E. 825 (1931).
53 International Aircraft Trading Co. v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 297 N.Y.
285, 79 N.E.2d 249 (1948) (A check drawn payable to a non-existing cor-
poration was held to be a "legal nullity, not entitled to be honored" and the
bank was liable for charging it against plaintiff's account.) ; Swift & Co. v.
Banker's Trust Co., 280 N.Y. 135, 145, 19 N.E.2d 992, 997 (1939) ("a mere
scrap of paper creating neither right nor obligation") (dictum) ; Jacoby v.
Klein, 241 App. Div. 470, 272 N.Y. Supp. 871 (1st Dep't 1934). But see Alent
v. Bank of United States, 131 Misc. 370, 226 N.Y. Supp. 653 (County Ct. 1928).
54This act has presently been adopted in eighteen states: ALA. CODE ANN.
tit. 39, § 13(3) (Supp. 1955) ; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 68-109(3) (Supp. 1957);
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3090(3) (West 1954); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 674.11(3) (Supp.
1957); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-209(3) (Supp. 1955) ; IOWA COD ANN. § 541.9(3)
(Supp. 1958) ; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 7:9(3) (West 1951) ; IDAHO CoDE ANN.
§27.109 (3) (1948) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 98, § 29(3) (Smith-Hurd 1935);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 335.052(3) (Supp. 1957) ; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 401.009(3)
(1952); MONT. REV. ConEs ANN. §55-209 (3) (1954); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§50-1-9(3) (1953); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-15(3) (1953); UTAH COD ANN.
§44-1-10(3) (Supp.'1957) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 6-361(3) (Supp. 1958) ; W. VA.
CoDE ANN. § 4321 (1955); WYo. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 40-109(3) (Supp. 1945).
See Swift & Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 280 N.Y. 135, 19 N.E.2d 992 (1939) ;
Citizens Loan & Security Co. v. Trust Co., 79 Ga. App. 184, 53 S.E.2d 179
(1949), 3 VAND. L. REv. 109.
55The Uniform Commercial Code has been adopted in Massachusetts
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in the name of a named payee is effective in all the impostor situa-
tions, whether in person, by correspondence or where a dishonest
agent has supplied the drawer with the name of a payee, real or
imaginary, intending that said payee have no interest in the instru-
ment. Such an endorsement is effective whether the instrument has
been issued to the impostor or his confederate. The Code section
also provides that it does not affect the criminal or civil liability of
a person so endorsing. 6
It should be noted that the Code does not make bearer paper of
the instrument, but rather makes the impostor's endorsement effec-
tive to transfer title.5 7 The stated purpose of the Code in the payroll
situation is to place the loss on the drawer, and thereby to make that
loss a cost of business. Both the Fictitious Payee Act and the Code
would place the loss on the drawer in each situation where they apply.
This would codify the majority rule in those cases where the drawer
and impostor deal face to face, or by mail, and in the payroll situa-
tions where the dishonest agent has the power to draw the check,
but would change the majority rule in the payroll cases where the
agent submits a padded list and would resolve the differences of
opinion where the agent submits a fictitious name. It would seem
that a person who would trick a drawer into issuing a check by pad-
ding a payroll list would not hesitate to write an endorsement in the
proper form so that the varying approaches of the Uniform Fictitious
Payee Act, not requiring endorsement, and the Uniform Commercial
Code, requiring one, would be of little practical difference. Further
if one accepted what appeared to be an order instrument without
endorsement, it would seem, that he might not be a holder in due
course because he would take it with notice of an infirmity. 58
Conclusion
Whether the dominant intent rule is psychologically sound or
not, it would seem that the courts will continue to apply it in im-
postor cases, at least until there is legislation on the point.
If the rule were generally recognized to be a legal fiction so that
the result aimed at would determine its application rather than the
converse, i.e., following the rule to its conclusion wherever it may
lead, there would be no need to do away with it. The fact that it
is not so recognized is again pointed up by a recent case 59 wherein
[MAss. ANN. LAWS C. 106, §3-405(1)(c) (Spec. Supp. 1958)] and Pennsyl-
vania [PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §3-405(1) (c) (1954)].
56 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-405(2).
57Compare UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §3-405(1)(c), with UNIFORM
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW §9(3) as amended and adopted in the states
mentioned in note 54 supra, which makes the instrument bearer paper.
58UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW §52(4), N.Y. NEGOTIABLE
INSTR. LAW § 91(4).
59 Atlantic Nat'l Bank v. United States, 250 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1957).
[ VOL. 33
NOTES
a dishonest government employee caused over a hundred instruments
to be drawn to non-existing payees. The court there applied the
theory to the effect that since the employee was the only person in-
volved he must have been the person with whom the government
intended to deal and consequently the proper person to endorse each
of the instruments.30 Early adoption of legislation in the area would
seem to be in order.
The legislation proposed and already adopted in some jurisdic-
tions I1 will serve the good purpose of doing away with the necessity
of using the dominant intent rule to decide the impostor 02 cases.
Moreover it will substitute the certainty of result advocated by many
as important to the free circulation of negotiable paper. 3 However,
it should be noted this legislation does not leave any room for a re-
covery by the drawer in a case where he was not negligent in the
issuance of the instrument and the person taking the instrument from
the impostor was negligent in so doing. 4
It is submitted that the difficulty of administering a rule allow-
ing for a recovery in such an instance would be no greater than the
difficulty presently encountered in discovering the intent of the drawer,
and would reach a more desirable and equitable result.
60 Id. at 117. See also note 51 supra.
61 See note 57 supra.
62 "It is meaningless and unworkable. It derives from elimination and
oversimplification among the mental drives which produce the delivery of the
instrument, and is as unreal as a frankly arbitrary approach to intention would
be, with the added disadvantage of deluding the courts and the profession into
the belief that it expresses a usable factual basis for differentiation." Abel,
The Impostor Payee at 231.
63 See, e.g., one of the more forceful statements: "In commercial law,
perhaps more than in any other field, Justice Brandeis' famous dictum holds
true: 'It is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than
that it be settled right.' To the banker and the businessman litigation is a
positive evil." Comment, 18 U. Cm. L. REy. 281, 286 (1951). See also 24 VA.
L. REV. 192, 193-94 (1937) (more desirable to facilitate commercial transac-
tions than to protect the party defrauded).
64 Although negotiable instruments have their roots in the law merchant,
Aigler, Commercial Instruments, the Law Merchant, and Negotiability, 8 MINN.
L. REv. 361 (1924), the common-law concept of negligence is not foreign to
this body of law. See, e.g., UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 23,
N.Y. NEGOTIABLE INsR. LAW § 42; Stella Flour & Feed Corp. v. Nat'l City
Bank, 285 App. Div. 182, 136 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1st Dep't 1954), aff'd inm., 308
N.Y. 1023, 127 N.E.2d 864 (1955). See also Leather Mfrs.' Bank v. Morgan,
117 U.S. 96 (1886); Gutfreund v. East River Nat'l Bank, 251 N.Y. 58, 167
N.E. 171 (1929); Coffin v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 374 Pa. 378, 97
A.2d 857 (1953); Abel, The Impostor Payee at 391-97. See also UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-406, adopting the reasoning of Young v. Grote, 4 Bing.
253. 130 Eng. Rep. 764 (C.P. 1827).
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